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Case No. 950705-CA
Priority (15)

Defendants and Appellees.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, and
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A.

Does a dissolved corporation retain its corporate

existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of
its assets, including standing to sue to quiet title to real
property owned by it?

(See Point I. and Point III.) Is it for the

same reasons subject to being sued regarding title to said assets?
(See Point V.)
201, and 194.

This issue was preserved in memoranda at R. 56,

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A motion for summary judgement is

only proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

No

deference is given to lower court's determination as to existence
of fact issue.
App. 1989).

Wycalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P2d 821, 825 (Utah

A fact issue exists as to whether the corporation is

dissolved (see Issue

C below), but even if we assume that it has

been dissolved, the extent and powers of its continued existence
are issues of law. Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P2d 231 (Utah
1993) .

This issue will be considered by the appellate court for

correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.,
870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993).

No deference will be given to the lower

court's decision on this issue.

State v. Pena. 869 P2d 932 (Utah

1994) .
B.

If plaintiff corporation has such standing, is there

any time limit within which action to protect its property must be
commenced?

(See Point II.) This issue was preserved in memoranda

at R. 56 and 201.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Appellant believes this to be a legal issue to be decided
under the same standards as Issue A above. If the clear meaning of
the applicable statute is to be limited by the implication of some
standard of reasonableness, then a genuine issue of material fact
is raised and summary judgment is improper.
County, supra.
-2-

Hiaains v. Salt Lake

C.

Has plaintiff corporation been dissolved?

(See

Point IV.) This issue was preserved at memoranda at R. 48 and 193.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A motion for summary judgement is only proper if there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Since no evidentiary hearing was

held, this issue was not resolved as a fact issue to which the
normal standard of review of "clearly erroneous" would apply. The
lower court ruled that the corporation was dissolved as a matter of
law,

and

therefore

the

connection with Issue A.

same

standard

applies

as

stated

in

Furthermore, all facts and inferences

therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
(in this case the plaintiff) against whom summary judgment is
sought.
D.

Was plaintiff entitled to oral argument on the

motion for summary judgment (and to alter and amend)?
VI.)

(See Point

This issue was preserved at memorandum at R. 46.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The issue of whether the lower court properly denied oral

argument as a legal issue, and the same standard applies as is set
forth in Issue A above.

The said ruling will be reviewed for

correctness, and the appellate court will give no deference to the
lower court's legal conclusion concerning whether plaintiff's
opposition to the motion for summary judgment was frivolous. Rule
-3-

4-501 (b) and (c) , Code of Judicial Administration, and State v.
Pena, supra.
E.

Should plaintiff have been allowed to amend to

correct any error with regard to proper party plaintiff?
Point III.)

(See

This issue was preserved at memorandum at R. 49.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The appellate court will review this issue for abuse of
discretion (lack of reasonable basis).
Exch. , 860 P2d 937 (Utah 1993).

Crookston v. Fire Ins.

Amendment is to be liberally

allowed in the interest of justice. Girard v. Appleby. 660 P2d 245
(Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
The following Statutes, Rules and Cases are believed
to be determinative of the issues in this action and are set forth
in full in the Addendum hereto:
1.

Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution

2.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.

3.

Section 16-10a-1405 and its predecessor, Section 16-10-

101 UCA
4.

Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965.

5.

Section 78-40-13 UCA

6.

Rule 4-501 (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an action by plaintiff
-4-

seeking to quiet title to three tracts of real property situated in
Utah County. (R. 5)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Defendant, Wilford H. Hansen

Stone Quarries, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereafter "Corporate
Defendant"),

and

defendant,

Sharron

Killion

(hereinafter

"Killion") , filed a Corrected Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
(R. 89)

Plaintiff filed a Amended Reply to said Counterclaim (R.

114) , and defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix
Jensen (hereinafter "Jensens") filed an Answer to said Cross-claim.
(R. 107)

The Jensens did not answer plaintiff's Complaint, but

filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b), URCP, or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment. (R. 9)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

The lower court treated

the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the same with
prejudice.

(R. 162, 184)

Timely Motion to Alter and Amend

Judgment was served and filed by plaintiff, but was denied. (R.
232)

The Counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and Killion was

dismissed with prejudice.

(R. 254)

The Cross-claim

of said

defendants against the Jensens was dismissed without prejudice. (R
254).

Notice of Appeal was filed on July 7, 1995 (R.238), and an

Amended Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1995 (R. 256), after
the

lower

court

entered

its

"Supplemental

Dismissal of All Claims" on September 29, 1995.

Order

Confirming

(R. 254)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the lower court to
-5-

quiet title to three tracts of real property
situated in Utah County,

(mining claims)

The Jensens were involved with only one

of the tracts, and the other defendants were involved in all three
of them.

(R. 5)
B.

The Jensens filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, alleging
that plaintiff corporation had been dissolved and therefore had no
standing to sue to quiet title to said properties, and alleged that
the Jensens had received quit claim deeds from plaintiff's "sole
remaining former shareholders to the Amis No. 1 claim.
C.

The Corporate Defendant

and Killion

(R. 8)
answered

plaintiff's Complaint and filed a Counterclaim against plaintiff
and a Cross-Claim against the Jensens (R. 89). Plaintiff filed a
Reply to said Counterclaim (R. 110) and the Jensens filed an Answer
to the Cross-claim. (R.107)
D.

Defendants filed no affidavits, but several were

filed on behalf of plaintiff.

The Jensens and plaintiff filed

certified copies of documents tending to show that some of the
statutory steps for dissolution of plaintiff corporation had been
undertaken.

(R. 36 and 40) The Jensens filed a Certificate of the

Utah Division of Corporations stating that plaintiff corporation
had been dissolved. (R. 41) Plaintiff however filed a Certificate
of Search of the Utah Division of Corporations certifying that
Certificate of Dissolution could not be found.
E.

(R. 154)

The Jensens never filed an answer to plaintiff's
-6-

Complaint and no discovery was undertaken, completed, or allowed.
F.

The lower court granted the Motion for Summary

Judgment of the Jensens and dismissed the plaintiff's Complaint in
its entirety and with prejudice as to the Jensens and also as to
all other defendants in this action.

(R. 162, 184)

The lower

court's order is based upon the following reasoning: w . . . Salt
Lake Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in
1965, and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or
be sued in Utah courts."
G.

The lower court's Order granting summary judgment

did not deal with the merits of the quiet title action.

(R. 162,

184)
H.
motion

for

Although requested (R. 46) , oral argument on the
summary

judgment was denied

plaintiff's opposition was "frivolous".

on the grounds that
(R. 162, 159)

Although

requested, oral argument on the plaintiff's motion to alter and
amend was not allowed.

(R. 232)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT I.

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE

EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF
ITS ASSETS.
Plaintiff denies that it has been legally dissolved, but
argues that dissolution is irrelevant on the issue of its right to
sue and be sued. Utah statutes since at least 1898, together with
Utah

case

law,

make

it

abundantly
-7-

clear

that

a

dissolved

corporation retains title to its assets and retains its corporate
existence for the purpose of protecting its assets and winding up
its affairs.

Although this has been the state of the law during

all of the years involved in this action, the current statute,
Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, provides:
"(1)
A dissolved corporation continues its corporate
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate
to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its
liabilities;
(d)
distributing its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interest; and
(e)
doing every other act necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs.
"(2)

Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a)

transfer title to the corporation's property..."

Plaintiff also argues that any rule requiring a voluntary
or involuntary transfer of title to assets to the shareholders of
the corporation is impractical and fraught with problems.

Instead

of stabilizing land titles, such a rule will hopelessly confuse and
complicate them.
POINT II.

THE POWER OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION TO

PROTECT ITS ASSETS IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY TIME LIMITATION, AND THERE
IS NO REASON IN LOGIC OR POLICY FOR IMPOSING SUCH.
Plaintiff argues that the foregoing statutes do not set
any time limit on protecting or disposing of assets by a dissolved
corporation, and argue that there is no reason in logic or policy
for imposing such.
-8-

Plaintiff points out that if there were such a limitation
(for example as a "reasonable time"), this would present a fact
question which would preclude summary judgment in any event.
The

lower

court's

apparent

fear

that

statutes

of

limitation will run if some time limit is not imposed is misplaced.
Statutes of limitation in adverse possession actions do not begin
to run until someone takes some action adverse to the owner. There
is no showing in this case that any of the required triggering
events ever occurred 30 years ago.
POINT III.

THE QUIT CLAIM DEEDS FROM EVELYN BOYCE AND

LOIS CONNELL WERE A NULLITY.
Jensens assert that they obtained quit claim deed from
certain of plaintiff corporation's stockholders, and apparently
argue therefrom that they have title to the disputed Amis No. 1.
The lower court never reached the merits and did not make any
ruling on ownership of Amis No. 1 or as to the other two claims.
Nevertheless, since this issue of the quit claim deeds was raised
by the Jensens, plaintiff feels that it must respond.
response is three fold:

Plaintiff's

(1) Said stockholders had no title to give

to anyone, because the title was vested in the corporation as
argued in Point I above; (2) The said quit claim deeds were
obtained by fraud and mistake and are invalid in any event;
(3) Defendants must prevail, if at all, on the strength of their
own title and not on any weakness in plaintiff's title.
POINT IV.

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION HAS NOT BEEN DISSOLVED.
-9-

Although this issue is not crucial to the outcome of the
case, plaintiff argues that a corporation is not dissolved until a
"Certificate of Dissolution" is issued by the State of Utah, and in
this case the Utah Division of Corporations has certified that
there is no Certificate of Dissolution on file.

Under Utah case

law, if a document is not found where it is supposed to be, there
is a presumption that it does not exist.

Therefore, plaintiff

corporation has never been dissolved.
POINT V.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S

DETERMINATION THAT SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY CANNOT BE SUED.
For the same reasons as set out in Point I above, a
dissolved corporation is subject to suit as well as retaining the
right to sue to protect its assets.

The lower court's ruling to

the contrary is contrary to statutory and case law, and is bad law.
POINT VI. THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT.
Jensens' motion for summary judgment was dispositive and
under Rule

4-501

Administration,
Plaintiff's

(b) and
plaintiff

(c) of the Utah Code of Judicial
was

entitled

arguments are grounded

to

oral

argument.

in fact and warranted by

existing law, as demonstrated by the preceding points.

Such

arguments were not "frivolous," and plaintiff was entitled to oral
argument.

The lower court acted arbitrarily and injudiciously in

denying oral argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE
-10-

EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF
ITS ASSETS.
Plaintiff denies that it has been dissolved.
III of this Brief.)

(See Point

Plaintiff contends, however, that it is

irrelevant whether it has been dissolved or not because under Utah
law, even if a corporation is dissolved, it retains its corporate
existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of
its assets.

Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, provides:

"(1)
A dissolved corporation continues its corporate
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate
to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its
liabilities;
(d)
distributing its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interest; and
(e)
doing every other act necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs.
"(2)

Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a)
transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b)
prevent transfer of its shares or securities,
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of
directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or
removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its
articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against
the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of
the corporation." (Emphasis added.)
-11-

The foregoing provision was enacted in 1992 and is the
currently-applicable provision. Prior thereto the relevant statute
was found at Section 16-10-101, UCA, which provided as follows:
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2)
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers."
(Emphasis added.)
The said Section 101 existed in that form since 1961 when
the Utah Business Corporation Act, of which it was a part, was
adopted

(except that prior to 1984 the Secretary of State was

referred to rather than the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code), and prior thereto the substance of said Section was found in
Section 16-1-2, UCA, and in substantially that form has been a part
of our law in Utah since at least 1898.
Section 16-10A-1405, UCA, does not contain any time
limitation.

Nor was there any time limitation in the predecessor

statute which was in effect from 1961 until 1992, and which was
found at Section 16-10-101, UCA.
In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley

Investment

Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P2d 915 (1964), our Supreme Court
upholds the clear meaning of said Section 101 where the court
states at page 915:
-12-

"Next, it is asserted that because of a dissolution
of the plaintiff corporation, it had no standing in
court, which seems to be answered by Title 16-10-100, 1610-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953."
Although the case of McKay & Knobel Enter., Inc. v. Teton
Van Gas, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969), dealt with a
corporate suspension, it found that the law relating to dissolution
was "instructive" and the court speaking through Justice Crockett
referred to said Section 16-10-101 and said Section 16-1-2 and
stated in connection therewith:
"We accept the fact that there are good and sufficient
reasons for this declared policy of the law that a
corporation, even though dissolved, is able to sue and
protect its assets. This enables it to better discharge
the duties the law imposes upon it: to pay its taxes;
to pay its creditors;
to meet its obligations to
stockholders who have invested in it. If in the process
of *winding up its affairs' the supposedly * insolvent'
corporation should manage to salvage sufficient assets to
revive and continue its life, it is only reasonable to
suppose that it would have as much right to sue and
conserve them as if it had proved to be completely
defunct." (Emphasis added.)
The court then went on to say that:
"The considerations set forth above as to why a dissolved
corporation, whose life has thus presumably been
terminated, should be able to protect its assets, would
seem to apply for even stronger reasons to a corporation
which has merely been * suspended.'"
The lower court ruled that the suspended corporation
could sue to protect the subject asset which in the Mackay case was
a negligence claim.
Even in the absence of a statutory provision such as we
have in Utah, it has been held under the corporate law generally
-13-

that even after dissolution, the corporation retains title to its
assets.

For example, in Screwmen's Benev. Assn. of Louisiana v.

Monteleone. 168 Louisiana 664, 122 Southern 116 (1929), the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held at pages 117 and 118:
"When once a legal and valid existent corporation becomes
the owner of property, such property remains the property
of the corporation until disposed of in a manner provided
by the charter or by the law.
"Neither the stockholders of a stock corporation nor the
members of a non-stock corporation ever become the owners
in common of the property of such corporations. . .
"The same is true with respect to a corporation whose
charter has expired, has been forfeited, or for any other
cause has been dissolved.
"Therefore, the property here involved continued to be
the property of the corporation, separate and distinct
from the members, and will remain so until disposed of or
transferee in some manner provided by law."
It is therefore clear that a dissolved

corporation

retains its corporate existence to protect and dispose of its
assets.
There are sound reasons for the rule adopted by our
statutes and our case law. We believe assert that numerous titles
in Utah (and no doubt elsewhere) are still held in the names of
dissolved corporations.

The lower court's decision would deny to

all of them the protection of the law. Plaintiff in its Complaint
alleges ownership of said three mining claims.

That allegation

must be taken as true on this motion for summary judgment.

Since

the plaintiff corporation has title, and since that title is
contested by defendants, and since the lower court has ruled that
-14-

plaintiff has no standing to sue to protect its title, one may
reasonably

ask what

is plaintiff

to do?

These

possibilities

present themselves:
(1)

Since plaintiff cannot protect its title, it must

forfeit to anyone who wants to seize it.
(2)

Plaintiff can convey its title to some person or

entity who has standing to sue to protect the property.
(3)

Plaintiff's title has somehow become vested in its

shareholders, who have the right to sue in their own names to
protect it.
Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.
(1)

FORFEITURE.

Title to real property

abandoned, and titles don't just evaporate or disappear.

cannot

be

There is

no justification to require that plaintiff's title be forfeited to
strangers for lack of ability to defend it. The law does not favor
forfeitures.

We are aware of no policy of the law that supports

this conclusion.

It would clearly violate the due process and

equal protection clause of the federal constitution, United States
Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, as well as the due process
clause of our state constitution, Constitution of Utah, Article I,
Section

7.

It is an absurd conclusion and one contrary to

justice, common sense and orderly procedure.
(2)

VOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF TITLE TO A NEW ENTITY OR TO

SHAREHOLDERS.
The statutes which we have cited clearly permit this.
-15-

However, said statutory provisions also say that the corporation
can sue to protect its assets.

The lower court has, however, now

ruled that after 30 years a corporation can no longer sue.

If 30

years deprives the corporation of the right to sue to protect its
assets, then logically the same 30 years must also preclude it from
conveying the property.
preclude

the

On the other hand, if 30 years does not

corporation

from

conveying

the

property,

then

logically it should not preclude the corporation from suing to
protect it.

There is no logical reason for treating the two

provisions differently.
Is there any policy reason for doing so? Is it proper to
deny access to the courts as some kind of a punishment for not
having disposed of the assets within some fixed period of time? We
do not think the Utah statutes so intend. In referring to "winding
up," our statutes are limiting the kinds of things the dissolved
corporation
accomplished.

can

do,

not

the

time

in

which

they

must

be

Many legitimate reasons exist for not disposing of

assets within some fixed period of time.
One reason is that corporation may have overlooked the
fact of its ownership. Original officers and directors eventually
die, and their successors in ownership of the stock of the mining
company may not be fully aware of all of its assets. The law would
not penalize an individual in this circumstance, why should it seek
to penalize a dissolved corporation?
Another reason is that as mining has declined in Utah,
-16-

some mining companies could no longer function economically, but
they nevertheless held on to their claims, no doubt in the hope
that mining would either improve, or at least that some profitable
use could be found for the land, as has occurred in the Park City
area for example.
individual

Here again the law does not penalize an

for this approach, and

it should

not penalize a

dissolved corporation either.
Counsel for plaintiff is involved with a number of these
old companies.

One has something like 700 shareholders.

has approximately 30.
exist.

Another

We believe that many such corporations

(We believe that the law is as we contend if there is only

one such corporation, but if the extent of the problem dictates the
applicable law, then discovery will be necessary to establish how
widespread this problem is. Plaintiff requested the opportunity to
conduct such (R. 196), but it was not permitted.)
Although

the

instant

case

does

not

involve

700

shareholders, the statutes make no distinction on the basis of the
number of shareholders, and the law applicable to the situation of
dissolved corporations will have to be the same no matter how large
or small the corporation may be. Due process and equal protection
require no less. The problems which the lower court's decision has
created become very apparent when we apply them to a corporation
having numerous shareholders.
It is not feasible to try to form a new corporation and
issue stock in the new company to all of the old shareholders.
-17-

Economics and the securities laws would prohibit or at least make
any such an attempt impractical.
shareholders

can

realistically

There is no way that these
be

given

stock

in

some

new

corporation.
A rule requiring the voluntary conveyance of the title
from the corporation to its shareholders is simply not feasible.
If for example 700 stockholders become tenants in common of a
mining claim, then how can it ever be sold?

Ownership of a mining

claim by such a large group as tenants in common will inevitably
bring unnecessary conflicts and problems. Allowing the corporation
the right to sell in an economic manner the assets which are still
held in the name of the corporation for the benefit of the known
stockholders and delivering to the Utah State Unclaimed Property
Division the money belonging to the missing shareholders seems to
be the best solution.
(3) INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF TITLE TO SHAREHOLDERS.
This proposal is objectionable for the same reasons as
set out for a voluntary transfer to shareholders.
Because of the problems inherent in title vesting in
shareholders, no one is going to voluntarily do it. An involuntary
transfer will by definition bring with it all of the problems
mentioned, and probably many other problems as well.
(4) A RULE REQUIRING VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF
TITLE TO SHAREHOLDERS CREATES NUMEROUS AND UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS.
The following are only a few of the numerous and complex
-18-

problems which are created if the courts adopt the rule that the
assets of a dissolved corporation must be transferred by the
corporation to its shareholders, either voluntarily or by operation
of law:
1.

Is a shareholder of a dissolved corporation to be

able to sell his interest at any time?

Only after 30 years?

At

some point less than 30 years?
2.

Does the same rule apply to his right to mortgage the

property?
3. If the corporation sells the entire claim to a third
party, and an individual shareholder sells his 1/700 of the claim
(assuming he owns that percentage of the stock) to another third
person, who prevails?
4.

Does the corporation lose title at some point, so

that its deed is totally invalid?
5.

Can the corporation deed out at any time if the

individual shareholders have not done so?
6.

Can

both

the

corporation

and

the

individual

shareholders deed out, and the one who first records gets title?
7. Does the transfer of stock in a dissolved corporation
carry with it the real estate, or after dissolution does the real
estate vest in the stockholder, so that transfer of his stock does
not carry with it his interest in the real estate?
8.

If the transfer of the shares does carry with it the

shareholders vested undivided interest in the real estate, then
-19-

what problems have we created by allowing real estate to be
transferred without a deed?
9. Voluntary transfer without a deed has not heretofore
been allowed, so how can it be wise or prudent to allow it now?
It is clear that the decision of the lower court instead
of stabilizing titles will only hopelessly confuse them.
Plaintiff does not seek to go back into business.

It

only seeks to quiet title to the subject mining claims so that it
can dispose of them advantageously, and it is far more economical
to allow the dissolved corporation to conduct the quiet title
action than to require the shareholders to do so. Such suits would
be cumbersome, unwieldy and unduly time-consuming.
POINT II.

THE POWER OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION TO

PROTECT ITS ASSETS IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY TIME LIMITATION, AND THERE
IS NO REASON IN LOGIC OR POLICY FOR IMPOSING SUCH.
The aforesaid Utah statutory provisions do not have any
time limitations.

There is no reason in logic or policy for

imposing such.
At the outset it should be noted that if some kind of a
time limitation is to be read into said statutory provisions, such
as a "reasonable time" for example, then what is a "reasonable"
time limit would have to depend upon all of the circumstances.
Such is an issue of fact and cannot be adjudicated on motion for
summary judgment in any event.

As noted above there a number of

reasons why a dissolved corporation may retain title to its
-20-

property and not distribute or otherwise dispose of it.
The lower court seemed to be influenced by the time
factor, when it stated in substance that nearly all statutes of
limitation will have run in 30 years.

The court was in error in

this regard.
Statutes of limitation which are involved in a quiet
title action do not begin to run until someone takes some action
adverse to the owner.

They do not begin to run until certain

triggering events occur, and there is no showing in this case that
any of those triggering events ever occurred 30 years ago.

In

fact, the Jensens did not even become involved with the title to
the tract which plaintiff seeks to quiet against them until 1993.
Certainly no statute of limitations has run since 1993.

There is

certainly no showing that defendants will be prejudiced by the
lapse of 1 or 2 years.
strengthens titles.

Normally ownership for over 30 years

Why in this case should 30 or more years of

ownership by plaintiff somehow be held against plaintiff?

Since

the Jensens have had no connection with this title prior to 1993,
how can they complain of the lapse of 30 years as it relates to
ownership of said tract?

The problems which the lower court

envisioned with regard to statutes of limitation, records and
memories do not exist.

But even if there a problem in this area,

it is a situation which the Jensens voluntarily chose to get
involved in, and they cannot complain of the fact situation which
they voluntarily entered into in 1993.
-21-

It

is

therefore

clear

that

plaintiff

retains

its

corporate existence and powers for the purposes of protecting and
disposing of its assets and that it can do anything incidental
thereto, including suing to preserve and protect the same so that
it will have something to dispose of.
purpose of the instant lawsuit:

That, of course, is the

to preserve and protect the

subject mining claim so that plaintiff can sell or otherwise
dispose of said asset in the most advantageous way.
POINT III.

THE QUIT CLAIM DEEDS FROM EVELYN BOYCE AND

LOIS CONNELL WERE A NULLITY.
The lower court did not rule on the merits and did not
rule one way or the other on the validity of certain quit claim
deeds signed by Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell.

Nevertheless, the

Jensens argued that said deeds gave title to the Jensens, and we
feel that the validity thereof must be addressed.

In support of

their motion for summary judgment, the Jensens submitted copies of
quit claim deeds from Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell.

Plaintiff

contends that said deeds are a nullity and irrelevant for at least
three reasons:
1.

Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell did not have title.

2. Plaintiff contends that the said deeds were obtained
by fraud.
3.

The Jensens must prevail upon the strength of their

own title and not upon any apparent weakness in the title of
plaintiff.
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BOYCE AND CONNELL HAVE NO TITLE:
The

Jensens

never

allege

under

oath

or

otherwise

demonstrate that plaintiff ever made any conveyance to Boyce and
Connell, nor do they allege under oath or otherwise any facts
showing a conveyance by the plaintiff to Boyce, Connell or anyone
else. The Jensens make the statement at page 5 of their memorandum
that

"Consequently,

even

assuming

arguendo

that

SLIC

had

theretofore still possessed any interest in Amis No. 1, Connell and
Boyce, as SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders, conveyed such
interest to the Jensen Defendants."
For the reasons set out in Point I# we do not believe the
shareholders hold title to the property of a dissolved corporation.
If dissolution of a corporation automatically passes title to its
assets to the shareholders, there would be no need for a statute
such as the said Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, which provides that a
dissolved corporation retains title to its assets and retains its
corporate capacity to protect and dispose of its assets.

If the

shareholders automatically succeed to the title to the assets, why
did the legislature make such provisions?

This has clearly always

been the law of Utah (at least since 1898) , but it has now been
specifically codified in said Section 16-10a-1405 (2) (a), which
provides

that

dissolution

corporation's property."

does not;

"transfer

title

to the

(Emphasis added.)

We also desire to note that, with the possible exception
of the law of descent and adverse possession, the title to real
-23-

property can only be acquired by deed. That mode for the transfer
of title is obviously the one contemplated by said Section 16-10a1405, and as noted above the Jensens do not and cannot claim that
there has ever been any deed

from plaintiff

to any of its

shareholders as to the subject property.
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT THE SAID QUIT CLAIM DEEDS WERE OBTAINED BY
FRAUD:
This is a quiet title action, and Section 78-40-13, UCA,
dealing with actions to quiet title provides:
"When the summons has been served and the time for
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear
the cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction
to examine into and determine the legality of the
plaintiff's title and of the title and claims of all the
defendants and of all unknown persons, and to that end
must not enter any judgment by default against unknown
defendants, but must in all cases require evidence of
plaintiff's title and possession and hear such evidence
as may be offered respecting the claims and title of any
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judgment in
accordance with the evidence and the law . . • "
This means that plaintiff shall have the right to present
evidence upon the issue of its claimed title, and the Jensens shall
have the right to contest such evidence, and likewise the Jensens
shall have the right to present evidence upon the issue of any
title they claim in themselves, and plaintiff shall have the same
right to contest such title.

If the Jensens' claimed title rests

upon said quit claim deeds, then, as noted above, plaintiff
contests said deeds and claims that said deeds were obtained by
fraud and mistake and are invalid, and in a quiet title action have
-24-

the right to so prove if they can do so, and cannot be precluded
from doing so by a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

See

Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 43 Utah 277, 135 P. 103 (1913).
If the quit claim deed of shareholders is somehow in law
the quit claim deed of the corporation through some kind of a
merger of identities, then it would appear that the corporation can
assert

any

defenses

regarding

fraud

and

mistake

of

the

shareholders, and that it would not appear necessary to join Boyce
and Connell to try the validity of the said quit claim deeds.

In

such event, the plaintiff corporation will assert the defense of
fraud and mistake under the present pleadings should the plaintiffs
assert the said quit claim deeds in this quiet title action by way
of counterclaim. Even if the said deeds were only raised by way of
answer by the Jensens, plaintiff can still raise the defense of
fraud and mistake under Rule 12(b), URCP, which provides in part:
"...If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which
the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law
of fact to that claim for relief."
If under any theory the presence of Boyce and Connell in
this action is necessary, plaintiff timely requested leave to join
them. (R. 49) There is no justification for dismissing plaintiff's
claims because of any misjoinder because under Rule 21, URCP,
"Misjoinder of parties is not
dismissal of an action."

ground

for

The opportunity to amend to join a proper party or
parties should have been granted.
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JENSENS MUST PREVAIL UPON STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN TITLE:
It is clear that there is no defect in plaintiff's title,
or at least a fact issues exists on that point.

Furthermore, it

must further be noted that if the Jensens are to prevail in this
quiet title action it must be upon the strength of their own title
and not upon any weakness in plaintiff's title.
Danaerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P2d 862 (1939).

See Babcock v.

Neither the Jensens

nor any of the other defendants have established their own title by
any means.
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION HAS NOT BEEN DISSOLVED.
Although the plaintiff corporation filed a Statement of
Intent to Dissolve dated June 18, 1965, and filed Articles of
Dissolution dated December 29, 1965 (R. 36 and 40) , no Certificate
of Dissolution was ever issued by the state and the plaintiff was
never dissolved. (R. 154)
Section

16-10-88, UCA, which

was

in

effect

in

1965

provided as follows:
"Duplicate originals of such articles of dissolution
shall be delivered to the secretary of state.
If the
secretary
of state finds that such articles of
dissolution conform to law, he shall, when all fees have
been paid as in this act prescribed:
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word
x
filed,' and the month, day and year of the filing
thereof.
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in his office.
(3) Issue a certificate of dissolution to which he shall
affix the other duplicate original.
"The certificate of dissolution, together with the
duplicate original of the articles of dissolution affixed
-26-

thereto by the secretary of state, shall be returned to
the representative of the dissolved corporation• Upon
the issuance of such certificate of dissolution the
existence of the corporation shall cease, except for the
purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate
corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers
as provided in this act." (Emphasis added.)
The Jensens presented a certified copy of the Division of
Corporations certifying that the plaintiff corporation had been
dissolved.

(R. 41)

Dissolution.

They did not present

a Certificate of

Plaintiff, however, presented a Certificate of that

same Division of Corporations certifying that no Certificate of
Dissolution could be found. (R. 154)
In Tree v. White, 110 Ut 233, 171 P2d 398 (1946), the
Utah Supreme Court cited with approval at page 400 of the opinion
the following quotation from Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135, 139:
" 'The law presumes that all officers entrusted with the
custody of public files and records, will perform their
official duty by keeping them safely in their offices.
Where a paper is not found where, if in existence, it
ought to be deposited or recorded, the presumption
therefore arises that no such document has ever been in
existence. Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich. 260. Until this
presumption is rebutted, it must stand as proof of such
non-existence.'fl
The Supreme Court of Utah went on to say:
"It would extend a presumption beyond all rational
limitations to assume that documents which cannot be
found where they should be found if executed, were
nevertheless properly executed and attached to the proper
records."
Without a Certificate of Dissolution there has been no
dissolution of plaintiff corporation under our statute.

The

presumption that there has never been any such Certificate of
-27-

Dissolution has not been rebutted. At the very least a fact issue
exists as to which certificate of the Division of Corporation is
correct, which the lower court could not resolve on the face of the
two conflicting certificates.

The Division was apparently aware

that it had exceeded its authority in purporting to certify that
plaintiff was dissolved and was reluctant to contradict itself by
issuing the certificate of search demonstrating that its initial
certification was in error.

Counsel for plaintiff relates these

difficulties in two affidavits in the record. (R. 61 and 128) They
finally issued it however. (R. 154)
The lower court erred in finding a de facto dissolution.
Such a finding is contrary to our statute and is meaningless. Our
statute, as we have noted above, expressly keeps a dissolved
corporation alive when it states that it: "continues its corporate
existence," it is thus de jure not de facto until it disposes of
its assets, and there is no basis in law to conclude that it is a
de facto dissolved corporation.
POINT V.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S

DETERMINATION THAT SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY CANNOT BE SUED.
The lower court has stated

in its said Order that

plaintiff "lacks standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts."
(Emphasis added.)
plaintiff

who

The lower court's ruling would require a

desired

to

quiet

title

against

a

dissolved

corporation having 700 shareholders, to track down and name as
parties 700 shareholders.

This is manifest error.
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POINT VI. THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT.
Jensens7 motion for summary judgment was dispositive and
therefore

under

Administration,
Plaintiff's

Rule

4-501

plaintiff

(b)
was

and

entitled

arguments are grounded

existing law.

(c), Code
to

of

oral

Judicial
argument.

in fact and warranted by

Where the statute says that dissolution does not

divest a corporation of its assets, is it "frivolous" to claim the
benefit of that statute?

Could any lawyer fail to do so> without

being accused of incompetence?

The lower court acted arbitrarily

and injudiciously in denying oral argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the
District Court in favor of the Jensens and against plaintiff should
be reversed, and this action remanded for^ tri*

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.
Section 16-10a-1405
Section 16-10-101 UCA

(predecessor to Sec. 16-10a-1405)

Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965.
Section 78-40-13 UCA
Rule 4-501 (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration.
IMPORTANT PLEADINGS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
Page of record
Complaint

5

Motion to Dismiss, or Alternately
for Summary Judgment
Certification of Voluntary Dissolution

9
41

Certificate of Search

154

Ruling (on motion for summary judgment)

162

Order Granting Jensen Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment

184

Ruling (on motion to alter and amend)

232

Supplemental Order

254

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
1.

Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

2.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

3.

Section 16-10a-1405 UCA:

(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence
but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind
up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its
liabilities;
(d)
distributing its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interest; and
(e)
doing every other act necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs.
(2)

Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b)
prevent transfer of its shares or securities,
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of
directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or
removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its
articles of incorporation;

(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against
the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of
the corporation.

4.

Section 16-10-101 UCA:
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2)
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers.

5.

Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965:
Duplicate originals of such articles of dissolution shall
be delivered to the secretary of state. If the secretary
of state finds that such articles of dissolution conform
to law, he shall, when all fees have been paid as in this
act prescribed:
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word
* filed,' and the month, day and year of the filing
thereof.
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in his office.
(3) Issue a certificate of dissolution to which he shall
affix the other duplicate original.
The certificate of dissolution, together with the
duplicate original of the articles of dissolution affixed
thereto by the secretary of state, shall be returned to
the representative of the dissolved corporation. Upon
the issuance of such certificate of dissolution the
existence of the corporation shall cease, except for the
purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate
corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers
as provided in this act.

Section 78-40-13 UCA:
When the summons has been served and the time for
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear
the cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction
to examine into and determine the legality of the
plaintiff's title and of the title and claims of all the
defendants and of all unknown persons, and to that end
must not enter any judgment by default against unknown
defendants, but must in all cases require evidence of
plaintiff's title and possession and hear such evidence
as may be offered respecting the claims and title of any
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judgment in
accordance with the evidence and the law. The judgment
shall be consclusive against all the persons named in the
summons and complaint who have been served and against
all such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and
summons who have been served by publication.
Rule 4-501 (3) (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration:
(b)
In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the acdtion on the
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing
th principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to
a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds
that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake Cityf Utah
84111
Telephone: 322-1141
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC., A Utah
corporation, SHARRON KILLION,
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or
lien upon the real property
described in the pleading adverse
to the plaintiff's ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

Civil No.
Judge:

Defendants.
The plaintiff complains of the defendants and for cause
of action alleges as follows:
1.

The plaintiff is a Utah corporation sometimes known

and designated in the Office of the Utah Secretary of State (and
successors) as Corporate File No. 30474.
2.

The plaintiff

is the owner

in fee simple and

entitled to possession of a certain real property ("Property")
situate in Utah County, Utah, and more particularly described as
follows:

000

AMIS NO. 1 PLACER, a patented mining claim being Patent
Mineral Survey No. 4224, and being a part of Sections 35
and 36, Township 11 South, Range 9 East, SLB&M.
(Containing approximately 17.466 acres.)
3.

The defendants assert and claim an interest in and

to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said
Property.
4.

The claim asserted by the defendants is without any

right whatsoever, and the said defendants have no estate, right,
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part
thereof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That the defendants be required to set forth the

nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all
adverse claims of the defendants be determined by decree of this
court and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed
as follows:
A.

That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple

and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the
defendants, and that the title to the Property, and the whole
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the defendants.
B.

That the defendants and any and all persons, if

any, claiming by, through or under defendants have no right, title
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property, or any
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the defendants be
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declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that
the defendants and all persons, if any, claiming by# through or
under said defendants be forever enjoined, debarred and restrained
from asserting any claim or interest whatsoever in or to the said
Property herein described adverse to the ownership and title of the
plaintiff in and to said Property or clouding plaintiff's title
thereto.
C.

That the plaintiff be awarded such further and

additional relieftas to the court may seem just and proper.
D.

For costs and for such other relief as is just
*

to be granted in the premises.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilford H.
Hansen

Stone Quarries, Inc. and Sharron Killion

(hereinafter

referred to as "Defendants" in this Second Cause of Action), and
for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

The plaintiff is a Utah corporation sometimes known

and designated in the Office of the Utah Secretary of State (and
successors) as Corporate File No. 30474.
2.
entitled

to

The plaintiff
possession

("Property") situate

of

is the owner
certain

tracts

in fee simple and
of

real

property

in Utah County, Utah, more particularly

described as follows:
Tract No. 1:
PHILIPPINE MINE LODE, a patented mining claim being
-3-
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Patent Mineral Survey No. 5874, and being part of Section
25, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M. (Containing
approximately 20.661 acres.)
Tract No. 2:
B, Bl, B2, B3, B4, and B5 LODE, a group of patented
mining claims being Patent Mineral Survey No. 6866, and
being part of Sections 35 and 36, Township 9 South, Range
3 West, SLB&M. (Containing approximately 121.955 acres.)
3.

The Defendants assert and claim an interest in and

to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said
Property.
4.

Th£ claim asserted by the Defendants is without any

right whatsoever, and the said Defendants have no estate, right,
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part
thereof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That the Defendants be required to set forth the

nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all
adverse claims of the Defendants be determined by decree of this
court, and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed
as follows:
A.

That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple

and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the
Defendants, and that the title to the said Property, and the whole
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the Defendants.
B.

That the Defendants and any and all persons, if
-4-

any, claiming by, through or under Defendants have no right, title
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property or any
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the Defendants be
declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that
the Defendants and all persons, if any, claiming by, through or
under said Defendants be forever enjoined, debarred and restrained
from asserting any claim or interest whatsoever in or to the
Property herein described adverse to the ownership and title of the
plaintiff in and, to said Property or clouding plaintiff's title
thereto.
C.

That the plaintiff be awarded such further and

additional relief as to the court may seem just and proper.
D.

For costs and for such other relief as is just

to be granted in the premises.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilford H.
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc. and Sharron Killion

(hereinafter

referred to as "Defendants11 in this Second Cause of Action) , and
for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

The plaintiff adopts the allegations of the First

Cause of Action.
2.

The

Defendants

have

removed

stone,

or

other

materials, or both (hereinafter collectively described as "Stone")
from said Property without authorization from the plaintiff.
3.

The plaintiff has been damaged by such unauthorized
-5-
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removal of Stone in an amount not now known to plaintiff, and
discovery will be necessary to ascertain the full extent of said
damages.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiff

prays

for

judgment

against

Defendants for damages for the reasonable value of the Stone thus
removed from the property, as proved at trial, together with
interest and costs, and for such other relief as is just to be
granted in the premises.

/ IL/
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for the Plaintiff

-6-
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DEREK LANGTON (4068)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen,
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
•

•

*

*

•

*

THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

*

MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES, INC., a Utah corporation, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other
persons unknown, claiming any
right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real
property described in the
pleading adverse to the plaintiff's ownership, or clouding
its title thereto,

Civil No. 940400611
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendants James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix
Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen Defendants") hereby respectfully
move the Court for an Order dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint
146749

000
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with prejudice as against said Jensen Defendants for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted on the grounds that
(1) plaintiff

was

a Utah

corporation

which was voluntarily

dissolved in 1965, and which therefore no longer exists, (2)
plaintiff's

sole

remaining

former

shareholders, who are

the

individuals purporting to act on behalf of the corporate plaintiff
in bringing the present action, previously quit-claimed their
interests, if any, in the Amis No. 1 placer mining claim to the
Jensen Defendants.
Alternatively,

because

the

Jensen

Defendants

are

submitting certain documents in support of this Motion, this Motion
can properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This

Motion

is

further

based

on

the

accompanying

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support hereof.
DATED t h i s 3 f l f t i a y of December, 1994.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

(BV ^ T ^ ^ t i ^

/^^e^

5EREK LANGTOr
Attorneys for defendants James
Tc Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen
and Dix Jensen

146749
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereDy certify that on this 2D

day of December, 1994,

I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Robert C. Cummings
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

146749
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CERTIFICATION OF
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY
filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955,
filed Articles of Dissolution with this office on
December 30, 1965
and that the above named corporation was dissolved on
December 30, 1965,

AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION.
File Number: CO 030471

JDiF^te*

7/

THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT after searching the records in
our office and the permanent file of the corporation by the name

SALTLAJCE INVESTMENT COMPANY, file #030474,

it appears that a Certificate of Dissolution document cannot be found.
It is unknown whether such a document was issued or in fact, ever
existed.

AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION.

Dated
"/.

24th

this

March

. I!)

95

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
of
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

P«-ED

RULING ON DEFENDANT
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR(
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation,
SHARRON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN,
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all
other persons unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the
real property described in the pleading
adverse to the Plaintiffs-ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

CASE NO. 940400611
DATE: March 27, 1995
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' (James, Jerry, and Dix Jensen)
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Defendants, represented by
Derek Langton, filed memoranda in support of the motion. Plaintiff, represented by Robert C.
Cummings, filed memoranda in opposition to the motion. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have
submitted documents outside of the pleadings, and therefore, the Court considers the motion
as a motion for summary judgment. The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda
and other documents submitted to the Court, now enters the following:
RULING
L
FACTS AND PROCEDURE

000
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r»

According to the records of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah, the
Salt Lake Investment Company filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955,
Statement of Intent to Dissolve on October 22, 1965, and Articles of Dissolution on
December 30, 1965. The Department of Commerce was unable to determine whether or not a
Certificate of Dissolution was issued, but certified that the corporation was voluntarily
dissolved on December 30, 1965.
The Articles of Dissolution signed by Evelyn P. Boyce and Laron A. Boyce affirm
that all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been discharged and that all
property and assets of the corporation have been distributed among its shareholders. There
has been no evidence of any activity whatsoever of the Salt Lake Investment Company for
nearly 30 years; no business transacted, no filing of tax returns, etc. However, on October
24, 1994, this action was filed by Salt Lake Investment Company to quiet title to a patented
mining claim.
IL
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, together with the affidavits present no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Evidence which is in dispute

should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirberg v. West
One Bank. 872 P.2d 39, 40-41 (Utah App. 1994); Higgins v. Salt Lake City. 855 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah 1993).

000
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In Defendants' motion, the first claim is that Plaintiff, Salt Lake Investment Company,
is a dissolved corporation which does not have standing to sue or be sued. In response,
Plaintiff asserts that the corporation was not dissolved because an actual Certificate of
Dissolution cannot be located. However, the Court finds that based upon the filing of the
Notice of Intent to Dissolve and of Articles of Dissolution with the Department of Commerce,
that the Department properly determined that the Salt Lake Investment Company was
dissolved. Even if the Court were to deem the inability of the Department to locate a
Certificate of Dissolution as supporting the conclusion that the corporation was not dissolved
on December 30, 1965, the Court finds that thirty years of total inactivity together with the
other filings is sufficient to find a defacto dissolution.
Plaintiffs next argument is that even if the corporation is dissolved, Utah statutory law
in effect in 1965 as well as the present allows a corporation to sue and be sued after
dissolution as part of the winding-up process. See Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-1405
(1953 as amended in 1992); U.C.A. §16-10-101 (in effect in 1965). This Court finds that 30
years is far beyond a reasonable time to wind-up the activities of a corporation. Nearly every
single statute of limitations would have run in such a time, records have certainly been lost,
memories faded, and defendants would certainly be prejudiced by allowing a corporation to
sue under the "winding-up" exception thirty years after dissolution. Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company has no standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts,
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

ooo

160

Each party has requested oral arguments in this matter. However, the Court finds
Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to be frivolous, and therefore, declines to hear oral
arguments on the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c).
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an order of dismissal of all claims
consistent with this ruling, and the file shall be closed.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this 27th day of March, 1995.
BY THE COURT

Judge Lynn W. Davis
cc:

Derek Langton, Esq.
Robert C. Cummings, Esq.
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Esq.

ooo 159
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DEREK LANGTON (4068)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen,
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES, INC., a Utah corporation, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other
persons unknown, claiming any
right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real
property described in the
pleading adverse to the plaintiff's ownership, or clouding
its title thereto,

Civil No. 940400611
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

The Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary
Judgment, dated December 30, 1994, filed by defendants James T.
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen
Defendants") regularly came before the Court for decision. Because
162037
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both Plaintiff

and the Jensen Defendants

submitted documents

outside of the pleadings for the Court's consideration, the Court
accordingly treats the Motion as one for summary judgment pursuant
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
After full consideration of the memoranda, papers and
documents submitted by Plaintiff and the Jensen Defendants in
support of and in opposition to the subject Motion, the Court
issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 1995. In its Ruling, the
Court determined, based on the undisputed facts, that the Salt Lake
Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 1965,
and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or be
sued in Utah courts. Accordingly,
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Jensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary

162037
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Judgment, is hereby granted, and all claims set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint shall be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this Z 7 day of /l^\

/ £

, ,1995.

BY THE COURT •/.

tli

•'

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
"'V Cl'-.'

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for p l a i n t i f f

162037
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _/

day of April, 1995, I

caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEPENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Robert C. Cummings
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
HANSEN & MAUGHAN
Mountain'View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067

KJU

162037
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER AND
AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE: 940400611

EILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC. a Lftah corporation,
SHARON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN,
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all
other persons unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the
real property described in the pleading
adverse to the plaintiffs ownership, or
clouding it's title thereto,

DATE: June 9, 1995
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e), URCP. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
Support of its motion with Defendants filing a Memorandum in Opposition to the motion.
Plaintiff also filed a Reply Memorandum. The Court after carefully considering the
memoranda now enters the following:
RULING

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On March 27, 1995 the Court, upon motion of Defendants, Dismissed the complaint
filed by Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company against the Defendants. The Court found

000
i
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that Plaintiff Corporation had dissolved, either de jure or de facto, nearly thirty years prior to
the commencement of the action. Based on this finding the Court applied Utah law in effect
in 1965, the year of dissolution, and determined that there was no legal basis for the suit to
proceed.
Plaintiff now requests that the judgment be altered or amended due to plain error in
applying the law.
II.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Is the Order to Dismiss based on a faulty application of statutory law?

m.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the file the Court found that the Order signed by the Court is titled Order
Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment However, a plain reading of the
Order clearly indicates that the case was dismissed for lack of standing. The Court believes
that such a drafting error is a harmless error and not grounds for attacking the decision.
Plaintiff does not in fact raise this issue in its pleading and while referring to the Order as a
Summary Judgment Order, the arguments presented deal with the issues of standing and the
dismissal of the action.
Nothing in the memoranda filed with the Court persuades this Court that the judgment
should be altered or amended. Plaintiff corporation filed an intent with the State of Utah to
dissolve and according to the Articles of Dissolution filed with the State and signed by the
2

officers of the corporation HA11 remaining property and assets of the corporation have been
distributed among its shareholders, in accordance with their respective rights and interests."
Articles of Dissolution Fourth paragraph dated December 29, 1965 and filed with the State on
December 30, 1965. This certified statement along with the inaction of the corporation to
exert any action showing ownership or control over this property during the nearly thirty
years prior to this action supports the Court's finding of defacto dissolution and the lack of
standing to bring the action. This Court is not persuaded by the cases relied upon by Plaintiff
in argument. In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley Investment Company. 395 P.2d 915
(Utah 1964), there are insufficient facts detailed to determine whether the acceptance of the
staiurory wording of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, (in effect in 1965 but repealed in 1992),
relied upon in that case by that court applies to the instant case. In MacKav & Knobel
Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. Inc.. 460 P.2d 828 (Utah), the court used the statutory
provisions of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101 to analogize to a case where the corporation
powers had been suspended by the state. Neither of these cases provide substantial support
for the arguments set forth by Plaintiff.
IV.
DECISION
This Court declines to disturb the prior decision. In light of the above discussion, the
Court finds Plaintiffs request for oral argument on this motion unnecessary.
//
//

000
3

THEREFORE,
(1)

Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)
UJA.

(2)

Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this J_ day of A//l^

. 1995.

BY THE COURT

Judge Lynn W. Davis

cc:

Robert C. Cummings, Esq.
Derek Langton, Esq.

4
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ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for the Plaintiff
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake Cityf Utah
84111
Telephone 322-1141
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
CONFIRMING DISMISSAL OF
ALL CLAIMS

vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN' STONE
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, SHARRON KILLION
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or
lien upon the real property
described in the pleading adverse
to the plaintiff's ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

Civil No. 940400611
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
Pursuant to notice, a conference was held the 25th day of
September, 1995, between the Court and all parties through counsel,
wherein all parties through counsel were in communication with the
Court and other counsel; Robert C. Cummings, appearing as attorney
for

plaintiff,

defendants,

Derek

James

T.

K.

Langton

Jensen,

appearing

Jerry

Jensen

as

attorney

and

Dix

for

Jensen

(hereinafter "defendants Jensen"), and Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
appearing as attorney for defendants, Wilford H. Hansen Stone
Quarries,

Inc.,

A

Utah

Corporation

(hereinafter

"Corporate

Defendant"), and Sharron Killion (hereinafter "Killion"), and in
said conference the Court considered the matter of the finality of
the Order heretofore entered herein on the 27th day of April, 1995,
entitled "Order Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment" and the court having hearing the arguments of counsel and
having duly considered said matter, and whereas the Court intended
in and by said order of April 27, 1995, to dismiss all claims in
this action and not just those of the plaintiff, and whereas the
Court desires by this Supplemental Order to remove any ambiguity as
to the Court's said intention which may exist by reason of the
wording of said order of April 27, 1995,
NOW THEREFORE UPON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
complaint;

The claims in this action are
(2)

counterclaim

of

the

Corporate

defendant Killion against plaintiff; and

(1) plaintiff
Defendant

(3) cross claim of

Corporate Defendant and defendant Killion against
Defendants".

and

"the other

That the aforesaid Order entered on April 27, 1995,

was intended as a dismissal of all claims in this action, as
follows, to-wit: consistent with the Court's ruling that plaintiff
cannot sue or be sued, the said complaint and the said counterclaim
were intended to be dismissed with prejudice, and the intent of the
Court was to dismiss the said cross claim without prejudice.
2.

In ratification and confirmation of such intention,

it is hereby declared and adjudged that plaintiff's said complaint
-2-

and the said counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and of
defendant Killion are dismissed with prejudice, and the said cross
claim of the Corporate Defendant and of defendant Killion is
dismissed without prejudice?; and it is adjudged that no claims of
any kind are reserved for later determination by this Court, the
Court having disposed of all claims as to all parties.
DATED the

<£<$

day of September, 1995.

°4
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IT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
A copy of the foregoing proposed Supplemental Order was
mailed to Derek Langton, attorney for defendants Jensen, at his
address,

P. 0. Box 45898, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145-0898, and a

copy was mailed to Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., attorney for the
Corporate Defendant and for Sharron Killion, at his address, P. 0.
Box 67, Payson, Utah
"? >

84651-0067, all postage prepaid, this

day of September, 1995.

(<X*A fr &~ ;
Attorney for the Plaintiff
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